Government Attorneys and the Ethical Rules: Good Souls in Limbo by Sanders, Maureen A.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 3
3-2-1992
Government Attorneys and the Ethical Rules:
Good Souls in Limbo
Maureen A. Sanders
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Maureen A. Sanders, Government Attorneys and the Ethical Rules: Good Souls in Limbo, 7 BYU J. Pub. L. 39 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol7/iss1/3
Government Attorneys and the 
Ethical Rules: 
Good Souls in Limbo 
Maureen A. Sanders* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades reported decisions addressing 
the propriety of the actions of government attorneys have 
occurred with greater frequency than in the past. The decisions 
have occurred both within lawsuits in which a government 
attorney represents a party and within disciplinary proceedings 
against a government attorney. The increase is due, not to an 
increase in inappropriate behavior by public sector attorneys, 
but to the ever increasing complexity of their functions 1 and to 
the evolution of the ethical rules applicable to attorneys.2 The 
current ethical rules of the fifty states are unsatisfactory when 
applied to government attorneys because they mandate certain 
behavior while failing to take into account the constitutional 
and statutory powers and duties imposed upon government 
attorneys. This failure results in a lack of meaningful ethical 
guidelines for government attorneys. Government attorneys are 
often compelled to operate in clouds of uncertainty because the 
ethical rules fail to relate professional ethical responsibilities to 
the substantive law related to governmental operations. 
Consequently, government lawyers must at times disregard the 
* Maureen A. Sanders is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of 
New Mexico School of Law. She previously served in the New Mexico Attorney 
General's office as the Director of the Civil Division and as General Counsel to the 
State Corporation Commission. She is grateful to her research assistants who 
helped in the gathering of the research for this article and to the financial 
assistance of the friends and alumni of the University who made possible a 
summer research grant. 
1. Joseph Lesser, The Changing Role of the Public Sector Lawyer-An 
Historical Overview, 11 URBAN, STATE & LOCAL LAW NEWSLETTER at 9 (1988). 
2. Len Biernat, Corporate Practice: From the Model Code to the Model Rules to 
the States, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 27 (1989). 
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technicalities and the underlying rationale of the ethical rules 
to accommodate the requirements imposed by law.3 
This article will point out the problems for government 
attorneys existent with the current rules by focusing on the 
states' attorneys general. The difficulties for attorneys general 
and their staff are encountered by every government lawyer. 
We will begin by examining the powers and duties of the 
states' attorneys general and then use that examination to 
point out the ambiguities and inherent conflicts of the existing 
ethics rules when they are applied to the attorneys general and 
their assistants. Finally, proposals for changes in the ethical 
rules will be offered and discussed. 
II. POWERS AND DUTIES OF 
STATES' ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Every state and territory has an attorney general or 
similar official.4 How an individual becomes attorney general 
differs among them. Forty-two of the attorneys general are 
elected.5 Eight are appointed by governors,6 one by a state 
legislature 7 and one by a state supreme court. 8 
The powers and duties of the attorneys general vary 
considerably from state to state. The variances arise from ( 1) 
the sources of the powers and duties, (2) the beneficiaries of the 
duties, and (3) the functions falling within the mandated or 
allowed powers and duties. The route to the office of the 
attorney general in some cases impacts the view an attorney 
general or the courts has as to the powers and duties 
encompassed by the position.9 The powers and duties of a state 
attorney general may be imposed by the state constitution or 
statutes, or a combination of the two. 10 Additionally, many 
8. Ann Bradford Stevens, Can the State Attorney General Represent Two 
Agencies Opposed in Litigation? 2 GEO. J. LEUAL ETHICS 7n7 (1989). 
4. William C. Hallett, Jr., Tice v. Department of Transportation: A Declining 
Role for the Attorney Gmeral? 68 N.C. L. REV. 10fi1 (198fi). 
5. Letter from Lynne Ross, Deputy Director, National Association of Attorneys 
General (March 18, 1987) (on file with the author). The statistics include the 
Attorneys General of the territories as well as the states. 
6. Id. The ten are: Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands and 
Wyoming. 
7. Id. The state is Tennessee. 
8. Id. The state is Maine. 
9. See text accompanying notes 74 to 77. 
10. At least twenty-four states have constitutional provisions which describe 
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state courts have decided that the state attorney general has 
common law powers to protect the public interest. 11 These 
common law powers have been discussed as including the 
authority to institute and litigate all suits and proceedings as 
the attorney general "deems necessary for the enforcement of 
the laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the 
protection of public rights and interest."12 In those states 
recognizing common law powers of the attorney general, the 
courts have tended to find that the attorney general has certain 
inherent powers 13 and have allowed the attorney general a 
great degree of latitude in exercising those powers as long as 
the attorney general did not abuse them by acting arbitrarily 
or capriciously. 14 Other courts have taken the position that an 
attorney general's power is strictly circumscribed by the state 
constitution and statutes. 15 At least one court has held that 
the attorney general powers enumerated in the constitution are 
exclusive and cannot be enlarged or restricted by the 
legislature except in the manner authorized by the 
constitution. 16 
, The actual functions of the state attorneys general which 
are mandated or allowed by the law also vary considerably. 
They may include representation in litigation, the giving of 
opinions, general advising, criminal prosecutions, appellate 
advocacy or membership on various boards with other public 
officials. In some instances the functions may be exclusively the 
attorney general's and in others it may be shared with other 
public officials or is delegable. 
some of the duties of their respective attorneys general. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF 
ATT'vS GEN., COMMITTEE ON THE OFF. OF ATT'v GEN., THE STRUCTURE OF STATE 
LEGAL SERVICES (1976). 
11. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATT'vS GEN., COMMON LAW POWERS OF STATE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 22-23 (1977); see also Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd., fi6R 
S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1978). 
12. Pierce v. Superior Court, 37 P.2d 4fi3, 461 (Cal. 19a4). 
13. See, e.p., State v. Thomas, 297 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 19fi6) (court recognized that 
if attorney general had common law powers, attorney general would have duty to 
represent state whenever state had right to sue). In Fergus v. Russell, 110 N.E. 
130 (Ill. 191fi), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the General Assembly had no 
power to divest the attorney general of the common law powers inherent in the 
office because they were constitutionally vested. John W. Freels, Powers of the 
Attorney General of Illinois, 53 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 119, 123-24 (1971). 
14. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Khorey, 555 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1989). 
15. See, e.g., State v. Bron, 537 N.E.2d fi84 (Ind. 1989) and State ex rel 
Haskell v. Huston, 97 P. 982 (Okl. 1908). 
16. Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 19fi6). 
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The intended beneficiaries of the powers and duties of the 
attorneys general also vary considerably. They may include 
state executive officers, departments and agencies, judicial 
officers and agencies, county officers and agencies, municipal 
officers and agencies, district attorneys, state legislators and 
the general public. Some of the statutory and constitutional 
provisions are not particularly clear as to whom the attorney 
general owes duties. For example, a statute may provide that 
the attorney general is the chief legal advisor for the state with 
little or no additional delineation of dutiesY No mention is 
made as to which part of the state bureaucracy advice is to be 
given, and uncertainties arise as to the identity of the client for 
government attorneys. 18 Is the client a particular official, a 
particular agency/9 a particular branch of government,20 or 
the state as a whole?21 Other statutes provide that the 
attorney general should initiate and defend those matters in 
the public interest, 22 however, no guidance is provided as to 
who determines what is in the "public interest." "It is not 
obvious, however, that the 'public interest' would always 
dictate one course over another."23 
All of the attorneys general have some responsibility to 
represent state agencies and officials. Additional duties of the 
attorneys general are scattered throughout state constitutions 
and statutes. The attached table gives an overview of some of 
the more important functions of the attorneys general by state. 
An examination of the table will reveal the range of duties of 
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1974). 
18. Keith W. Donahoe, The Model Rules and the Government Lawyer. A Sword 
or Shield? A Response to the D.C. Bar Special Committee on Govemmrnt Lawyers 
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 GEO. J. LEUAL ETHICS 9R7 (19R9). 
19. The District of Columbia Bar Association issued a committee report 
suggesting that the employing agency should be considered the lawyer's client. Bar 
Group ldentifirs Agency as Goverment Lawyer's C:lient, 4 Laws. Man. on Prof. 
Conduct (ABNBNA) No. 20 at 350 (Oct. 26, 1988). 
20. Ward v. Superior Court., 138 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1977) (finding that the county, 
not the official is client). 
21. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks 
and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987). 
22. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-2J (1991) (attorney general shall "appear 
before local, state and federal courts and regulatory officers, agencies and bodies, 
to represent and to be heard on behalf of the state when, in his judgment, the 
public interest of the state requires such action or when requested to do so by the 
governor; . . . ."). 
23. FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, 86R F.2d ~H5, ~H9 (9th Cir. 19H9). 
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the attorneys general as well as the lack of consistency among 
the states as to the expectations for their attorneys general. 
Although a lack of consistency exists among the states, one 
general observation can be made. The states' attorneys general 
are obligated to offer their services to several individual 
entities or interests pursuant to the states' constitutions or 
statutes. 
These obligations arise by virtue of holding the office, not 
by choosing whether or not to accept a particular client. 24 This 
method of "obtaining clients" is foreign to private sector 
attorneys.25 The basis for the duties imposed upon private 
sector attorneys by disciplinary board ethical rules implicitly 
rely upon the contractual agreement reached between the 
attorney and the client.26 
No such voluntary assumption of obligations occur for the 
attorney general or the assistants on a case by case or client by 
client basis. While it could be said that the voluntary 
assumption of the attorney obligations occurs at the time one 
seeks election or accepts a job, neither the scope nor the subject 
matter of the representations is known at that time. The ability 
to withdraw from representation is an avenue not always open 
to an attorney general because of the statutory mandate that 
the attorney general represent, for example, a particular state 
agency.27 
This disparity between the attorney-client relationships of 
a government attorney and those of a private sector attorney is 
one largely ignored by the drafters of the ethical rules 
applicable to attorneys.28 While lip service to the distinction 
has been made in comments to the rules,29 the failure to 
24. Ward v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1977). 
25. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and 
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987). 
26. For example, as to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists: "Most of the 
duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has 
requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so." 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope cmt. 3 (West 1992). 
27. Cf. People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 172 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1981) (statute 
provided attorney general right to withdraw from representation of his statutory 
clients and to permit them to engage private counsel). 
28. The fact that no government attorney was included in the group of drafters 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct may be one cause of the oversight. See 
Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 693-95 (1989). 
29. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 7 (West 
1992). 
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recognize the distinction within the rules themselves is the 
source of many of the uncertainties regarding the behavior of 
government attorneys. The majority of the questions about 
government attorneys' behavior arise in what is generally 
viewed as a duty of loyalty owed by an attorney to a client. 
They generally arise amidst allegations that a government 
attorney has impermissible conflicts of interest or has violated 
client confidences. 
Ill. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS DILEMMAS OF 
GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS 
The conflict of interests dilemmas for attorneys general 
usually arise in four contexts: 1) disputes between two agencies 
or officials, 2) dual roles within one agency represented by an 
attorney general, 3) criminal investigation or prosecution of 
public officials, and 4) disagreement between an attorney 
general and another public official as to the appropriateness or 
legality of a particular action. 30 
· The first situation occurs when two state agencies or 
officials both represented by the office of the attorney general 
are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting 
views. The second situation occurs when a quasi-judicial body, 
like a public utility commission, and its staff, which advocates 
a position before the quasi-judicial body, are both entities of the 
state represented by the attorney general's office. The third 
situation which presents a conflict of interest question to state 
attorneys general occurs where a public official, represented in 
his official capacity by the attorney general, becomes the target 
of an attorney general criminal investigation or the subject of a 
grand jury proceeding. The fourth situation occurs when the 
attorney general concludes that the legal position which an 
agency or official wants advocated is contrary to that held by 
the attorney general or that a state statute is 
unconstitutional.31 
30. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL: POWERS AND DUTIES (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1988). 
31. Another conflict situation may arise when an attorney general is both a 
member and legal counsel to a board. The problems arising in this context will not 
specifically be addressed in this article because they are similar to those in the 
private sector when an attorney sits on a board and is the legal counsel for the 
board. One difference, however, may exist because the attorney general may be 
required by statute to wear both hats without the option to remove one of them. 
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The courts have repeatedly addressed these questions but 
have not answered with one voice. In reaching their conclusions 
the courts have considered the inherent power of the courts to 
preserve the adversarial nature of the matters before them,32 
the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory ,mandates for the 
attorneys general and, either directly or indirectly, the relevant 
ethical mandates for attorneys practicing in their states.33 The 
failure of the courts to reach consistent results in similar 
situations demonstrates the failure of the ethical rules to 
provide workable guidelines to government attorneys. 
A. Disputes Between Two Agencies 
The variety of the functions and the intended beneficiaries 
of the duties of state attorneys general which are mandated by 
statutes and state constitutions means that an attorney general 
will inevitably encounter a situation where two state agencies 
represented by the attorney general's office disagree in a partic-
ular matter.34 The disagreement may or may not lead to litiga-
tion, but the reported cases generally focus on the representa-
tion of two agencies or officials involved in litigation. If an 
attorney general has two agencies or officials requesting rep-
resentation, three options are available. The attorney general 
may represent both, neither or one. 
The ethical rules state that an attorney or a legal office 
cannot represent two clients whose interests are adverse. 
Courts and ethics committees which have been presented with 
a question as to the appropriate course of action for govern-
ment attorneys confronted with a two-agency conflict have 
usually been adamant that their conclusion as to appropriate 
behavior is the right one.35 Unfortunately for government attor-
neys, the judicial conclusions are not consistent. Some have 
said represent both;36 others proclaim the government attorney 
32. Public Uti!. Comm'n v. Cofer, 7fi4 S.W.2d 121, 124-2fi (Tex. 19R8). 
33. See, e.g., Polkey v. City of New Orleans, fifi7 So. 2d 40fi, 407 (La. Ct. App), 
cert. denied, fifi9 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1990). 
34. State ex ret. Allain v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 
1982). 
3fi. See, e.g., City of York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 281 A.2d 261 
(Commw. Ct. 1971), a{fd, 295 A.2d 82fi (Pa. 1972). 
36. See, e.p., State ex ret. Allain v. Mississippi Pub. Util. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 
779, 784 (Miss. 1982), Arizona State Land Dep't v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912, 91fi-16 
(Ariz. 1960). 
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can represent neither;37 still others conclude that the govern-
ment attorney should represent one of the clients.38 
The initial question sometimes addressed by the courts in 
these cases is whether the court is being presented with a case 
or controversy. Some have found that the existence of "the 
state" on both sides of the conflict means that two adversarial 
parties do not exist, so the jurisdictional requirement of case or 
controversy is lacking. Generally, the response has been that 
public officials should have the right to have their legal duties 
judicially determined. 39 
The ethical conflict when two opposing clients are involved 
centers on the notion, "No man can serve two masters."40 The 
argument is that an attorney general's office cannot be loyal to 
two clients who are in direct conflict. Nonetheless, several 
courts have concluded that two masters can in fact be served. 
In Connecticut Commission on Special Revenue v. Connecti-
cut Freedom of Information Commission,41 the appellate court 
determined that the Attorney General may represent opposing 
state agencies in a dispute.42 In doing so the court recognized 
that the attorney general had to represent the broader inter-
ests of the state, not merely two separate agencies. The court 
viewed the real client as the people who were entitled to have 
the state agencies represented by the constitutionally created 
legal officer of the state.43 In reaching that conclusion the 
court rightly recognized that any other decision would lead to 
the "absurd conclusion that in the event of any dispute whatso-
ever between two state agencies, even though that dispute was 
not in litigation, the attorney general could not act as legal 
advisor and lawyer for either agency because of the conflict 
indicated by their dispute."44 The court suggested that concerns 
about the appearance of impropriety could be lessened by hav-
ing the Attorney General himself file an entry on behalf of the 
37. People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 172 Cal. Rptr. 47H (19H1); ABA Cumm. 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 1282 (197::!). 
38. See State Health Planning & Coordinating Council v. Hyland, 891 A.2d 
1247, 1250-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (finding that the attorney general 
could refuse to represent one agency when already representing another). 
39. See Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1982). 
40. Matthew 6:24. 
41. 387 A.2d 588 (Conn. 1978). 
42. ld. at 587. 
43. ld. 
44. ld. at 538. 
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state and the assistant attorneys general enter on behalf of the 
respective state agencies.45 
Similarly, in Comrrwnwealth Department of Transportation 
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,46 the court recog-
nized that there are situations "which simply require the At-
torney General to wear two hats, as it were."47 Some courts 
have justified the dual role by relying on the responsibility of 
attorneys general to the public or to the public interest. 48 In 
doing so, the courts have generally recognized that they are 
redefining the identity of the client of a government attorney or 
are condoning a violation of the ethical rules regarding conflicts 
of interest. 
Other courts have taken a more narrow approach and have 
determined that the representation by an attorney general of 
more than one interest in a case poses an irreconcilable con-
flict.49 The results in these cases are consistent with the lan-
guage used in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
Code of Professional Responsibility. In reaching these decisions 
the courts have had to ignore the constitutional and statutory 
provisions which mandate representation by the attorney gen-
eral for the two competing officials or entities. To avoid having 
to ignore these laws, at least one court determined that a con-
flict requiring withdrawal does not exist if the attorney general 
opposes an order within the appropriate proceeding when the 
attorney general may have to enforce the order in the fu-
ture.50 
A government attorney faced with two agencies in conflict 
will find little guidance from court decisions as to the appropri-
ate course of action. The courts have analyzed the dilemma in a 
variety of ways with diverse outcomes. 
45. ld. at 538-39. 
46. 394 A.2d 61'!3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). 
47. ld. (relying on Ault v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 146 
A.2d 729 (Super. Ct. 1958), rev'd on other prounds, 157 A.2d 375 (Pa. 1960)). 
48. 387 A.2d 533 (Conn. 1978). 
49. Hanna v. Rewkowski, 365 N.Y.S.2d 609 (App. Div. 1975); City of York v. 
Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 281 A.2d 261 (Commw. Ct. 1971), affd, 295 A.2d 
825 (Pa. 1972). 
50. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 394 
A.2d 683, 61'!6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). 
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B. Dual Roles Within One Agency 
The second type of conflict of interest involves representa-
tion by the attorney general's office of one agency where the 
agency or parts of it have two separate functions which, at 
least initially, appear to be contradictory. For example, it is not 
unusual for a utility commission to have its own staff appear 
before it in certain rate cases. The staff is usually presenting a 
position contrary to that taken by the regulated industry while 
the commission itself is usually performing an adjudicatory 
role. The staff may well be represented by an assistant attor-
ney general while the commission is assisted in its quasi-judi-
cial function by the attorney general's office. Thus the same of-
fice is representing a party and the decision-maker. 
While the courts have been troubled by this arrangement, 
they seem to view the situation as unavoidable given the gener-
al nature of many state and federal agencies. Those agencies 
often have investigative and quasi-judicial functions. 51 The 
courts have been reluctant to find an inherent inappropriate 
conflict for the attorney general's office and have tended to 
analyze the situation within due process notions.52 
In North Fulton Community Hospital, Inc. v. State Health 
Planning & Development Agency the court was faced with an 
argument that a dual role for an attorney within an adminis-
trative hearing is per se prejudicial.53 The court declined to 
make such a finding and determined that a case by case analy-
sis was necessary. The court went on to say the real question 
was the fairness of the hearing. It recognized that administra-
tive hearings are not "fitted with all the trappings" of criminal 
procedure or civil procedure. The focus of the court's analysis 
was whether the other parties and their attorneys had a fair 
opportunity to present their case. The advice to the decision 
maker had to be made in an "evenhanded manner with due 
regard for the procedural rights of all parties."54 
A similar question arose when an attorney general's office 
represented the public residential ratepayers in a rate hearing 
51. North Fulton Comm. Hosp., Inc. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 
310 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
52. ld. at 769. 
53. 310 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). See also Schaffer v. State Bd. of Med-
icine, 237 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). 
ii4. North Fulton, 310 S.E.2d at 771. 
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while assisting the commission hearing the case.55 In that case 
the court recognized that the two individuals from the attorney 
general's office assigned to assist the commission functioned 
independently of the Attorney General. With no evidence of 
control over the commission's attorneys exercised by the Attor-
ney General, the court concluded that a conflict of interest did 
not in fact exist. 56 At lead one court has recognized that if the 
government attorneys representing two interests or functions 
do not act separately and independently of each other, the 
court must take appropriate action, including dismissal.57 
C. Criminal Prosecutions of Public Officials 
The third apparent conflict occurs when the attorney gen-
eral investigates or prosecutes a public official. Attorneys gen-
eral of most states have duties which involve the handling of 
both civil and criminal cases on behalf of the state. 58 In pursu-
ing criminal investigations or seeking criminal indictments an 
attorney general may be investigating or indicting public offi-
cials. Often these public officials are represented by the attor-
ney general when they are acting in their official capacities. 
The question then arises as to whether or not the attorney gen-
eral is able to prosecute or investigate public officials who are 
advised in their official capacities by the attorney general with-
out having an unethical conflict of interest. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question 
of whether an unethical conflict of interest existed where the 
Attorney General of New Mexico assisted the United States 
Attorney in prosecuting two public officials of New Mexico who 
had been represented in their official capacities by the office of 
fifi. In re Rates & Charges of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 6fi::l P.2d fi01 
(N.M. 19R2). 
56. !d. at 504. 
57. In re Randy G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970-71 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (court dismissed 
juvenile proceeding because attorneys from corporation counsel's office representing 
two interests did not remain separate). 
5R. For example, most attorneys general may initiate local prosecutions in at 
least some instances. Only eight states reported that the attorney general may 
never initiate prosecutions under any circumstances. NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATT'Ys 
GEN., COMMITIEE ON THE OFF. OF ATT'Y GEN., THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION: LOCAL 
PRoSECUTION AND THE ATIORNEY GENERAL (1974). See also Pietra v. State, 530 
N.Y.S.2d fi10, fi12 (1988) (attorney general is given no general prosecutorial author-
ity and except where specifically permitted by statute has no power to prosecute 
criminal actions). 
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the attorney general.59 In reaching its decision that no conflict 
of interest existed, the court relied on the district court's con-
clusion that an inherent conflict of interest does not arise mere-
ly because a state attorney general prosecutes a state officer 
whom he represented in his official capacity on matters unre-
lated to the offenses charged. 60 
Finding no inherent conflict of interest, the court proceeded 
to determine whether an actual conflict of interest existed. The 
court determined that no confidential information regarding 
the matters contained in the indictment had been communicat-
ed by the defendant to anyone in the attorney general's office. 
The district court also concluded that the New Mexico statute 
required the Attorney General to defend actions against a state 
officer only when the cause of action arises while the officer is 
acting in his official capacity. The indictment only alleged un-
lawful personal acts not encompassed by the public officer's 
official duties. Thus, the attorney general was not the 
defendant's attorney for matters related to the criminal prose-
cution and was not barred from participating in the prosecu-
tion. 
A similar result was reached when the governor of Arizona 
was the target of a grand jury investigation.61 The court con-
cluded that the attorney general was not precluded from initi-
ating grand jury proceedings concerning the governor if the 
attorney general and the governor had not communicated re-
garding the matter being investigated.62 Prior to that decision 
the Supreme Court of Arizona had concluded that the attorney 
general would violate ethical principles if he presented a case 
to the grand jury concerning matters he and the governor had 
confidentially discussed. 63 
D. Disagreements as to What is the Public Interest 
The fourth type of conflict situation an attorney general 
encounters occurs when the attorney general wants to take 
some action on behalf of the "public interest." State statutes 
often impose a duty upon the attorney general to represent the 
59. United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428 (lOth Cir. 1987). 
60. !d. at 1438·39. 
61. Mecham v. Superior Court e.x rel. Corbin, Sup. Ct. of Az. No. CV-87-0410-
SA, State Grand Jury Inquiry No. 235, G.J. 73, Nov. 18, 1987. 
62. !d. 
63. Corbin v. Broadman, 433 P.2d 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). 
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public interest. The ethical conflict typically arises when a 
state official or the legislature has a view different from the 
attorney general's as to what is in the public interest. A state 
agency director may disagree with the attorney general as to 
the advisability of taking a particular appeal.64 An attorney 
general may believe the public interest requires suing a public 
official or agency for a violation of the law. 65 The legislature 
may pass a statute which the attorney general believes is un-
constitutional or generally against the public interest and 
therefore the attorney general seeks a declaratory judgment or 
refuses to enforce it.66 Courts faced with these types of conflicts 
usually center their analysis on whether the attorney general 
has the power, or should have the power, to bring those actions 
or make those decisions. 
One of the concerns of the courts when an attorney general 
rules on the duties to the public interest or public good is the 
separation of powers doctrine. 67 The separation of powers doc-
trine embodies the systems of checks and balances existent in 
government on both the federal and state levels. 68 The underly-
ing rationale is the avoidance of undue accumulation of power 
in one person.69 Courts fear that if a state attorney general is 
allowed to use the power of the office to control access to the 
judicial system in a way that tramples the authority of the 
executive or legislative branches, then the protection of the 
checks and balances will be lost. 70 
In addition to separation of powers concerns, the courts 
have addressed the propriety of an attorney general determin-
ing what is the public interest. In Manchin u. Browning the 
court stated, "The Attorney General's role in this [representa-
tive] capacity is not to make public policy in his own right on 
behalf of the state.'m The states have complex sets of institu-
tions to analyze and define the public interest. Should one gov-
64. Feeney v. Commonwealth, 86n N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977). 
6fi. State Bd. v. Bowers, No. 4fi47H (Ga. 19HH). 
66. Fund Manager, Public Safety Personnel Retirement Sys. v. Corbin, 77R P.2d 
1244 (Ariz. Ct. App.), affd in part and dismissed in part, on other grounds, 778 
P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1989). 
67. See, e.g., Baxley v. Rutland, 409 F. Supp. 1249, 125fi (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
6R. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Con-
stitutional SchernR: In the Be{;inninf.{ There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. fi6l. 
69. Id. 
70. Motor Club v. Department of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510, fil5-16 (Iowa 1977). 
71. 296 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 19R2). 
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ernment attorney be able to set their view of the public interest 
above the views of other public officials?72 
The courts have answered this question with both affirma-
tive and negative responses. Some have said the office of the 
attorney general does not have the power to determine public 
interest at least to the extent of accessing the judicial sys-
tem. 73 Others have said that the attorney general has a right 
to refuse to represent a particular position and then allow 
private counsel to be selected.74 Courts have also split on wheth-
er attorneys general can seek a declaratory judgment that a 
state statute is unconstitutional. 75 A different analysis may be 
required when the attomey general is an elected official. In 
that event the people have elected a person so that indepen-
dent judgment regarding the legal affairs of government can be 
had. 76 
IV. CONFIDENTIALITY DILEMMAS OF GoVERNMENT 
ATTORNEYS 
Government attomeys have been criticized for their disclo-
sure of what some would view as confidential information. 
Views certainly vary on what is confidential information when 
dealing with public entities. 77 The various state sunshine laws 
regarding open meetings and public records certainly provide 
limits as to what claims of confidentiality may be made. 7R As-
suming that at least some information a govemment attomey 
may have is confidential, to whom can disclosure be made or, 
72. William Josephson & Russel Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer 
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict, 29 How. L.J. fi39, fi6fi 
(1986). 
73. See, e.g., State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 17fi N.W. 372 (N.D. 1919). 
74. Superintendent of Ins. v. Attorney Gen., fifi8 A.2d 1197 (Me. 1989). 
7fi. Compare Hetherington v. McHale, 311 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1973) rev'd on other grouncL~. 329 A.2d 2fi0 (Pa. 1974) with Fund Manager, Public 
Safety Personnel Retirement Sys. v. Corbin, 778 P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App.), affd in 
part and dismissed in part, on other grounds, 77?. P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1989); see also 
State v. Burning Tree Club, 481 A.2d 7Rfi (Md. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth ex 
rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 86fi (Ky. Ct. App. 1974). 
76. Eric Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 RECORD 649 
(1977). 
77. For a general discussion see Jack B. Weinstein & Gary A. Crosthwait, 
Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attorneys and c:tients, 1 TOlTRO 
L. REV. 1 (Spring 1985). 
78. Ann Bradford Stevens, Can the State Attorney General Represent Two 
Agencies Opposed in Litil{atiun? 2 GEO. J. LE()AL ETHICS 7fi7, 776-RO (19?.9). 
t 
r 
! 
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alternatively, to whom are duties of disclosure or confidentiali-
ty owed? 
Courts and committees addressing the issue of disclosure 
have encountered problems similar to those struggling with the 
conflicts issues. The Federal Bar Association Ethics Committee 
has opined that the extent of confidentiality a government 
lawyer owes to those consulting him or her varies in degrees 
according to the subject matter. 79 Disclosure beyond the agency 
or other law enforcing or disciplinary authorities was consid-
ered to be 
warranted only in the case when the lawyer, as a reasonable 
and prudent man, conscious of his professional obligations of 
care, confidentiality and responsibility concludes that these 
authorities have without good cause failed in the performance 
of their own obligation to take remedial measures required in 
the public interest.80 
Others have concentrated on the danger of silencing govern-
ment attorneys regarding wrongdoing in government. "If there 
is wrongdoing in government, it must be exposed. The law 
officer has a special obligation not to permit a cover-up of ille-
gal activity on the ground that exposure may hurt his par-
ty."111 The balancing of the need to keep some things confiden-
tial against the duty to expose wrongdoing by public officials is 
a difficult task for government attorneys within the loyalty 
concepts contained in the current ethical rules. 
V. THE LOYALTY ETHICAL RULES 
The current ethical rules applicable to loyalty of govern-
ment attorneys and courts' applications of them are unsatisfac-
tory. A discussion of the application of them to the typical con-
flicts and confidentiality questions encountered by attorneys 
general will dramatically illustrate their inadequacies. 
All fifty states have ethical mandates governing the con-
duct of attorneys.82 Generally, loyalty to a client is required to 
79. Federal Bar Assoc., Professional Ethics Corum., Op. 73-1 (1978) (the 
goverment client and confidentiality). 
RO. !d. 
Rl. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical u. Political Problems of a Government At-
torney, 1H MK L. REV. 1fifi, 160 (1966). 
R2. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MoDERN LEOAL ETHICS § 2 (1986). 
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some degree. 83 The mandates include restrictions on 
attorneys' behavior regarding conflicts of interests and confi-
dentiality. Although the restrictions vary from state to state, 
many incorporate the language of either the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility (hereinafter Code)84 or the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter Rules). 85 The 
Rules, adopted in 1983 by the American Bar Association, will 
be used throughout the following discussion. Similar concerns 
arise in those states which use the Code when drafting their 
rules. 
A. Applicability to Government Attorneys 
Traditionally, the courts and disciplinary authorities have 
assumed that a state's ethical rules apply to government attor-
neys.86 Attorneys general and other government attorneys are 
required to be licensed to practice law and in some states are 
required to be members of the state bar.87 Thus, adherence to 
the rules of the licensing entity such as the state supreme 
court or the state bar is a condition of holding the office. The 
Rules and their respective official comments specifically discuss 
their applicability to government attorneys.88 Attempts to ex-
empt government attorneys from certain parts of the Rules 
have been unsuccessful.89 Arguments that the ethical mandates 
were not applicable to certain situations faced by government 
attorneys have often fallen on unsympathetic judicial ears.90 
83. !d. at § 4.1. 
84. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was originally adopted by the 
American Bar Association in 1969. Subsequently it was adopted in some form by 
forty-nine states and influenced California's rule. CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MoDERN 
LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6 (19R6). Some of those states have since adopted the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
8fi. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were originally adopted in 198~:! by 
the American Bar Association. 
R6. SeP, e.f!., State ex rel State Bar Ass'n v. Douglas, 416 N.W.2d fi1fi (Neb. 
1987), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 4RR U.S. R02 (1988) (government attorney 
violated the Code in a criminal case). 
87. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
8R. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope cmt. 4 (West 1992). 
89. William Josephson & Russel Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer 
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When c:lients Are in Conflict? 29 How. L.J. 539, fi43, 557 
nn.1fi & R6 (19R9). 
90. See, e.g., Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 19R2) (attorney 
general has duty to conform conduct to that prescribed by the rules of professional 
conduct). 
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No one advocates that a government attorney should be 
free of any ethical mandates. In fact many would say that a 
government attorney ought higher standards than those im-
posed on others because of their special status representing the 
state.91 "A government attorney is required to be more circum-
spect than a private lawyer, as improper conduct on the part of 
a government attorney is more likely to harm the entire system 
of government in terms of public trust."92 The ethical stan-
dards required of government attorneys should, however, be 
applicable to their roles. At the very least the government at-
torney ought to have guidelines which assist decision-making 
rather than ones which cloud the issues by employing concepts 
foreign to the role of the government attorney.93 
At times the courts have recognized a selective nonapplica-
bility of the ethical mandates to government attorneys based on 
an analysis giving state statutes and constitutions superior 
status over ethical rules or on an analysis of the requirements 
of separation of powers.94 In the first instance the courts have 
found that the ethical rules conflict to some degree with the 
powers and duties imposed by the state constitution or statutes 
and have concluded that the former must give way to the lat-
ter.95 For example, state law may require the attorney general 
to represent state agencies when they are involved in litigation 
while the ethical rules may provide that no attorney may advo-
cate a position contrary to a client's interest. If two agencies 
are involved as adverse parties in a lawsuit, an attorney 
91. Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom of Info. 
Comm'n, 3H7 A.2d fi33 (Conn. 197H). 
92. Stephen R. Kaye, Conflicts in Representation: An Overview of Developments 
Durin!{ 1987 and 1988, Practicing Law Institute (December 12, 198H). 
93. Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics; The Making of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989). For a discussion 
of similar concerns for those lawyers representing close corporations, see Lawrence 
E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation; Toward a Realis-
tic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466 (1989). 
94. For example, in State Bd. v. Bowers, No. 45478 (Ga. 1988) the supreme 
court determined that the attorney general was subject to the Code of Professional 
Responsibility but that the Code could not be construed to prevent him from tak-
ing a legal position adverse to the state, the agencies or public officials when the 
action is authorized or required by state law. 
95. Public Util. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 19HH); cf Krahmer v. 
McClafferty, 2H2 A.2d 631, 633 (Del. 1971) ("Ethics super[s]edes any requirement of 
a City Charter such as we have here which would seem to require that he or a 
member of his staff represent even though there might be a conflict of interest 
involved."). 
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general's office representing either state agency would, of ne-
cessity, have to advocate a position contrary to at least one of 
its clients. 
The separation of powers doctrine has been employed in 
these instances by focusing upon what could be the result of a 
violation by an attorney of the ethical rules. If an ethical rule is 
violated, disbarment or license revocation is usually an avail-
able sanction.96 If bar membership or a license is a prerequi-
site to holding the office of attorney general, then removal from 
public office could result. 
Generally, however, removal procedures for elected public 
officials such as the attorney general are set out in the provi-
sion in the law establishing the office.97 It is not unusual for 
the procedure to call for an impeachment process in the legisla-
ture or a recall process by the voters prior to ousting a state 
attorney general. Neither of these methods would be employed 
if the licensing authority sought disbarment or de-licensing 
based on a violation of an ethical rule. Allowing for what 
amounts to a removal from office by methods distinct from the 
removal process mandated by law would be an incursion by the 
judiciary into the powers of the executive branch. Thus, a viola-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine would occur if the 
ethical rules were applied to the attorney general in that par-
ticular instance. Finding such an incursion unacceptable in the 
form of government established in this country, the courts have 
refused to strictly apply all the ethical conflict rules to the 
attorney general. 9x If the duty to represent the state agencies is 
constitutionally mandated, then the courts should find that the 
constitutional mandate prevails over the ethical requirements 
under the general notion that constitutional provisions trump 
conflicting statutes or judicial rules.99 
The secondary status given ethical mandates is also under-
standable as a natural result of applying general principles of 
96. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MoDERN LE!:AL ETHICS § :1./i (1986). 
97. See, e.g, Simpson v. Alabama State Bar, :ill So. 2d 807 (Ala. 197/i). 
9H. The Supreme Court of Georgia, at least partly in response to the disciplin-
ary action brought by the Stat<> Bar against the attorney general modified its rules 
to provide: "No provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility shall be con-
strued to prohibit [a full time government lawyer] from taking a legal position 
adverse to the State, its agencies, or officials, when such action is authorized or 
required by the Constitution or statutes of this State." RULES OF THE STATE BAR 
OF GEOR<aA Rule 4-102. 
99. ld. 
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the hierarchy of law when the ethical mandates have been 
adopted as rules of the supreme court while the duties of the 
attorney general regarding representation are contained in 
state statutes. Generally, in the absence of unconstitutional 
overreaching by the legislature, the hierarchy requires statuto-
ry provisions to prevail over judicially adopted rules. 100 Howev-
er, in some states the ethical mandates are contained in 
statutes. 101 In those states where the ethics mandates and the 
attorney general duties are both statutory, two statutes would 
necessarily conflict when an attorney general had a duty to 
represent two agencies in a dispute. Usually the rules of statu-
tory construction would require that the specific statute would 
prevail over the general statute. 102 In that event the ethical 
statute is the more specific of the two and should prevail. Be-
cause the attorney would have to take a position adverse to a 
client if representation of either agency occurred, the attorney 
general would be precluded from representing either client 
even though statutorily required to represent both. 
The secondary status sometimes given to the ethical man-
dates can probably be best understood by looking at their histo-
ry. The attorney ethical rules began on a national level in 1908 
as Canons of Professional Ethics. 103 In 1969 the American Bar 
Association redrafted the Canons into the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. 104 In 1983 the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct were adopted. 105 The evolution into the Rules 
involved a transition from trade association principles of "nice 
behavior" into a set of rules similar to a set of laws. 106 The 
Code had limited enforceability because of the non-mandatory 
nature of the language used in the Ethical Considerations. The 
principles contained in the Ethical Considerations of the Code 
were aspirational in nature. 107 The Rules, on the other hand, 
employ language which clearly set the requirements attorneys 
100. See, e.f?., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354 (NM 
1976). 
101. CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MoDERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6 (1986). 
102. TABEZ GRIDLEY SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
51.05 (Dallas C. Sands, 4th ed. 1984 Revision). 
103. Len Biernat, Corporate Practices from the Model (}ode to the Model Rules to 
the States, :14 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 27 (19R9). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. L. Ray Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance 
and Rule of thf' Client, 1 GEn. J. LEt;AL ETHICS 1, 52 (1987). 
107. ld. at 56. 
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must follow to avoid sanctions imposed by the appropriate 
governing body. These Rules have become part of the ethical 
rules of many states. As they become more ingrained in the 
minds and hearts of judges and viewed as mandates rather 
than aspirational goals, the judges may not be so quick to rele-
gate them to a secondary status as they have in the past. In 
that event government attorneys may find themselves facing 
disciplinary action rather than judicial determinations in a case 
where the government attorney represents a party and it is 
alleged that the attorney has acted inappropriately. 
B. Conflict of Interest Rules 
The Rules set out lawyers' duties to clients, the legal sys-
tem and themselves. The Preamble to the Rules presents the 
concept that while all lawyers must act in an ethical manner, 
some differences may exist as to the duties of attorneys repre-
senting states and those representing private individuals. 108 
Other differences are also acknowledged between the ethical 
obligations for representation of a legal organization or entity 
and those for representing individuals. 109 Three of the Model 
Rules address conflicts of interest specifically. 110 The goal of 
these three rules is to insure that the lawyer's loyalty lies with 
his client rather than with himself or another person. 
1. Rules dealing with conflicts of interest 
Rule 1. 7 is the general conflict of interest rule. 111 It prohib-
its a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of 
that client will be directly adverse to another client. 112 The only 
exception to the prohibition applies if the lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will not adversely affect the rela-
tionship with the other client and each client consents after 
consultation. 113 Rule 1. 7 also prohibits a lawyer from represent-
ing a client if the representation may be materially limited by 
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a third person or 
by the lawyer's interests. 114 Again, the lawyer is exempted from 
lOR. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope cmt. H (West 1992). 
109. ld. 1.13. 
110. ld. at 1.7, l.H & 1.9. 
111. ld. at 1.7. 
112. !d. at 1.7(a). 
113. ld. 
114. !d. at 1. 7(h). 
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this prohibition if the lawyer reasonably believes the represen-
tation will not be adversely affected and the client consents af-
ter consultation. 115 Furthermore, if the lawyer is seeking con-
sent from the client to represent multiple interests in a single 
matter, the consultation must include an explanation of the 
implications, advantages and risks of the common representa-
tion.116 
Rule 1.8 lists transactions which are prohibited because 
they would form the basis for an inappropriate conflict of inter-
est. 117 Many of the prohibited transactions are ones which are 
not particularly relevant to an inquiry regarding common con-
flict of interest questions unique to state attorneys general. 118 
One of the prohibitions is, however, endemic to attorneys gen-
eral conflict questions. The rule prohibits the use of informa-
tion relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of 
the client unless the client consents after consultation. 119 
Rule 1.9 is the conflict of interest rule which applies with 
respect to former clients. 120 It prohibits a lawyer from repre-
senting a person in the same or a substantially related matter 
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the 
interests of a former client unless the former client consents 
after consultation.m Rule 1.9 also prohibits a lawyer from 
using information relating to the representation to the disad-
vantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 regarding confi-
dentiality allows or when the information has become generally 
known. 122 
2. Conflict of interest dilemmas for government attorneys 
The ethical rules relating to conflicts of interest presuppose 
an ability of the attorney to decline to take on some individuals 
or entities as clients and to identify who the client is. The inac-
curacy of these assumptions when applied to attorneys general 
places them in a position of choosing between failing to perform 
11fi. !d. 
116. !d. 
117. ld. l.H. 
11R These include, for example, prohibitions on business dealings with clients, 
on the lawyer being a beneficiary of a will drafted by the lawyer, on literary or 
media agreements and on giving financial assistance to a client. Id. 
119. ld. at l.R(b). 
120. ld. at 1.9. 
121. ld. at l.9(a). 
122. ld. at 1.9(b). 
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an obligation imposed by law or violating, at least in some 
eyes, an ethical rule which has been promulgated by the su-
preme court, legislature or bar association of the state. At its 
most extreme the choice is to be guilty of dereliction of duty or 
unethical behavior. In other words, lose your job or lose your 
license (or perhaps lose both). An examination of the four con-
flict situations encountered by attorneys general within the 
context of the ethical rules will provide background for these 
conclusions. 
a. Disputes between two agencies or officials. Given the 
decentralization of many of the state functions it is not unusual 
for two state agencies or other entities represented by the at-
torney general to find themselves in a dispute that requires 
them to seek legal counsel and perhaps to sue each other. 123 If 
one takes the view that the agencies or the officials are the 
clients of the attorney general, representing both of them would 
be a violation of Rule 1.7. That rule prohibits representation of 
adverse clients unless the lawyer believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the attorney-client relationships and 
each client consents to the dual representation. The comments 
to the rule provide that it may be appropriate for a government 
lawyer in 
some circumstances [to] represent government employees in 
proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing 
party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend 
on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging 
fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a 
declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. 124 
This comment seems, however, to be intended as an expla-
nation of the rule rather than as an exception to it. It seems 
that a lawyer would still have to make the determination that 
the attorney-client relationship would not be adversely affected 
if the dual representation continued. Even if the lawyer be-
lieves that the adverse representation is appropriate, the law-
yer must obtain the consent of both of the clients for such rep-
12:~. See, e.!(., State v. Mississippi Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 41R So. 2d 779 (Miss. 
19R2). In those instances where the two agencies are under the control of one state 
official, the superior state official could command a resolution and avoid the litiga-
tion. 
124. MomcL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.7 cmt. R (West 1992). 
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resentation. 125 Both of these requirements are difficult to 
meet. 126 
The relationship between the attorney general or the assis-
tants and the agencies and officials is often one instilled with 
trust and confidence and would be adversely affected if the 
attorney engaged in dual representation. Many clients, even in 
their official roles, would feel betrayed if "their attorney" repre-
sented another with an adverse claim even if the other were an 
arm of the state. Additionally, an attorney general representing 
both agencies which are in a dispute would certainly at times 
have to make statements or take positions which would be 
adverse to one of the clients. That action is specifically prohib-
ited by Rule 1. 7. The attorney is also prohibited from using 
information relating to representation of a client to the disad-
vantage of the client unless the client consents after consulta-
tion. If the attorney general represents either or both, the at-
torney general would, of necessity, be using information relat-
ing to the representation of the client to the disadvantage of a 
client (or former client). Few public officials or agencies would 
consent to that use. Thus, the attorney general may be viewed 
as having violated the duty of loyalty owed to the clients. 
If the view is taken that the state agency or the executive 
branch of the state or the state itself is the client, then the 
attorney general must also analyze the situation in light of 
Rule 1.13 which gives guidelines to attorneys having an organi-
zation as a client. 127 That rule, which according to the com-
ments is applicable to government entities, 128 provides that a 
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the 
organization rather than the persons involved in the organiza-
tion. Of course every entity must act through its constituents or 
representatives. Consequently, a lawyer dealing with a person 
related to the entity may learn that an individual is acting or 
planning to act in a manner that would violate a legal obliga-
tion of the entity or which might be imputed to the organiza-
125. !d. at 1.7. 
126. In fact some have taken the view that a public agency cannot consent to 
such an arrangement. See William Josephson & Russel Pierce, Tu Whom Does the 
aovernment Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients are in Conflict?, 29 
How. L.J. li39, li47 n.34 (19R6). In fact New Jersey's conflicts rules provide that a 
government agency could never consent to representation by an attorney represent-
ing dual interests. !d. at li43 n.16. 
127. MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (West 1992). 
12!1. !d. at 1.13 cmt. 7. 
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tion and which is likely to cause substantial injury to the orga-
nization. Rule 1.13 provides that the lawyer "shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organiza-
tion."129 
While the quoted language is rather ambiguous, the Rule 
goes on to provide that the lawyer shall consider the serious-
ness of the violation, the nature of the lawyer's representation, 
the apparent motivation of the person involved, and organiza-
tional policies. 130 Mter considering these notions, a lawyer can 
take measures in a way which will minimize the disruption to 
the organization and the risk of revealing information outside 
of the organization. 131 Measures could include asking for recon-
sideration of the matter, suggesting a separate legal opinion be 
obtained, or referring the matter to a higher authority in the 
organization. The rule does not enlighten attomeys on how to 
analyze the hierarchy of an organization. For example, who is 
the highest authority in a corporation? Some would say the 
shareholders while others view this rule as prohibiting the law-
yer from divulging the matter to the shareholders. 132 The extra-
corporate revelation ban is absolute and thus provides special 
protection for corporate officials from disclosure of their wrong-
doing.133 Similar, and even more complex, questions arise 
when the organization is a govemment one. For example, does 
the highest authority analysis involve a look at the organiza-
tion as the agency, the branch of govemment, or the state? Is 
the highest authority the public? 
If the lawyer is unable to convince the organization to 
pursue a different course and the proposed action is clearly a 
violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to 
the organization, the lawyer is entitled to resign pursuant to 
Rule 1.16. In fact the lawyer may be required to resign. 134 Res-
ignation is not always a viable option for govemment attor-
neys. They may have constitutionally or statutorily imposed 
129. ld. at l.l.':l. 
180. ld. 
l::ll. L. Ray Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Le.Ral Ethics: The RelPvance 
and Rule of the Client, 1 GEO. J. LEc;AL ETHICS 43 (19H7). 
1::!2. Len Biernat, Corporate Practice: From the Model C:odP to the Model Rules to 
the State:-:, :14 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 27 (19R9). 
1.'3;:!. ld. at 4.'i. 
134. ld. at 40. 
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duties of representation. Resignation may be a violation of 
those duties. 135 
While Rule 1.13 does give some guidance to those having 
the organization as a client, it does not provide any guidance to 
the government attorney to decipher who the client may be. 
The comments to the Rule specifically state that the duty ap-
plies to governmental organizations. 136 The comments also 
provide that when the client is a governmental organization, a 
different balance may be appropriate between confidentiality 
requirements and assuring that the wrongful official act is 
prevented or rectified. 137 The justification given for the different 
balance is that public rather than private business is involved. 
The comment rather cavalierly, and unhelpfully for this analy-
sis, further suggests that in some circumstances the client may 
be a specific agency but generally the client for a government 
attorney is the government as a whole. 138 
The ethical rules give no analytical framework for the 
attorney who is in the position of viewing the public as the 
client. Certainly, the attorney cannot request a vote of the 
citizens of the state every time a decision must be made in a 
legal dispute. This concern is particularly relevant to states' 
attorneys general who have been independently elected by the 
citizens. 139 Generally, the citizens view the elected attorney 
general as their lawyer with independent powers to pursue the 
public good. 140 
No matter what view is taken of the identity of the client, 
the attorney general runs afoul of an ethical rule when two 
agencies are involved in a controversy. Attorneys general could 
take the view that they are the ultimate decision-maker as to 
the correct legal view. This notion may run afoul of separation 
of powers notions where the attorney general, rather than the 
judiciary, is deciding legal controversies141 or where the attor-
ney general, who is not generally viewed as the supreme execu-
tive officer, is dictating to the executive branch what course of 
action must be followed in a particular transaction. 142 Some 
131i. See Public Utility Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 123-24 (Tex. 1988). 
136. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 7 (West 1992). 
137. !d. 
13R. !d. 
139. See supra notes 73 - 76 and accompanying text. 
140. See Erik Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 RECORD 
OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 649 (1977). 
141. See supra notes 67 - 70 and accompanying text. 
142. William Josephson & Joseph Pierce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer 
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would even contend that the agency attorney who substitutes 
his or her own judgment for that of the political process, which 
is generally accepted as legitimate, is acting unethically. 143 
The second alternative is for the attorney general to repre-
sent the side taking the position consistent with the attorney 
general's view of the matter. The attorney general will, of ne-
cessity, have to take positions materially adverse to the client 
it is no longer representing. That action would be a violation of 
Rule 1.9. 
If the second agency is to obtain private representation, 
decisions must be made as to who will be selected, how the 
choice of counsel will be made, and who will pay for the repre-
sentation.144 Often state law requires the selection of any spe-
cial counsel to be made by the attorney general or at least with 
the approval of the attorney general. 145 In those instances the 
attorney general would be in the position of hiring or approving 
opposing counsel-a strange notion. The degree of supervision 
that the attorney general employs over opposing counsel may 
be mandated by the statutes and regulations regarding expen-
ditures of public funds. 
The use of special counsel also tends to be an inefficient 
method of providing services. 146 Even in civil cases the courts 
tend to recognize the desirability of having public officers rep-
resenting public interests 147 since "to allow the numerous state 
agencies the liberty to employ private counsel without approval 
of the attorney general would invite chaos" into the legal rep-
resentation of the state. 148 
The substantive law of governmental entities is complex. 
Many hours would have to be spent by special counsel to "get 
up to speed" at a high cost to the state. The further question of 
whose budget will be tapped for payment of special counsel 
often becomes a source of contention between the unrepresent-
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. fi39, fi67 
(19R9). 
148. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and 
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (19R7). 
144. See City of Tukwila v. Todd, fi68 P.2d 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (approv-
ing retention of private counsel when city council has no faith in the city attor-
ney). 
14fi. State v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 41R So. 2d 779, 7R7 (Miss. 19R2). 
146. NATIONAL Ass'N OF A'IT'YS GEN., COMMI'ITEE ON THE OFFICE OF A'IT'y GEN., 
THE STRUCTURE OF STATE LEGAL SERVICES (1976). 
147. McQuesten v. Attorney Gen., 72 N.E. 96.5 (Mass. l901i). 
14R. EPA v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, fi3 (Ill. 1977). 
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ed agency and the attorney general's office. 149 If the agency will 
be responsible for payment, the financial question may well 
result in the attorney general winning by default in times of 
limited state budgets. 
The third alternative for the attorney general is to repre-
sent both agencies in court. 150 While this may seem bizarre to 
those practicing in the private sector, it may well be possible to 
establish "screens" within the attorney general's office and have 
separate assistant attorneys general arguing for the two agen-
cies involved in the dispute. 151 The attorney general is then 
able to provide representation to both of his clients or client 
constituents. This result requires a certain amount of trust in 
the attorney general not to directly or indirectly intimidate the 
assistant attorney general taking a position contrary to that 
personally held by the attorney general. 152 
The final possibility is that the attorney general represents 
nobody and special private counsel is appointed for each side of 
the dispute by the attorney general or selected by the individu-
al agencies. This final result still provides financial and selec-
tion questions and to some degree does not resolve the conflict 
problem because presumably the attorney general may well 
have the ultimate power to select or discharge private attor-
neys representing the state. The power to appoint implies the 
power to remove, and thus the power to control. 153 
In any of these scenarios the attorney general would be 
running afoul of an ethical rule if anyone other than the people 
or the state or the particular branch of government is consid-
ered to be the client. The violations occur because the attorney 
14:1. SPe State Health Planning & Coordinating Council v. Hyland, 891 A.2d 
1247 (N.J. 197H). 
150. See, P.f?., Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom 
of Info. Comm'n, 8R7 A.2d 5::!:-l (Conn. 197H). 
1fil. These "screens" have been used in situations where an attorney has 
changed employment. Their use in those circumstances allows a firm to continue in 
a case even though one of its attorneys has a conflict. See MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.ll(b). 
1fi2. Public Uti!. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. 19HH) (if attorney 
general engages in collusive representation, then a violation of separation of powers 
occurs); State v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 19H2) (allow 
assistant attorneys general to represent separate state agencies in a dispute be-
tween them unfettered and uninfluenced by the attorney general's opinion). 
1fi8. City of York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 281 A.2d 261 (Pa. 1971), 
affd, 2:1fi A.2d H2fi (Pa. 1972); see also Janene M. Marasville, Removeability and 
the Rule uf Law: The Independence of the Solicitor General, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
7fi0 (l:IH9). 
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general's office itself, or the private counsel it supervises, will 
be representing a client directly adverse to another client in 
violation of Rule 1.7. It could use information relating to repre-
sentation of a client to the disadvantage of the client in viola-
tion of Rule 1.8. Or it will represent another with materially 
adverse interests to those of a former client in violation of Rule 
1.9. 
If the people, the state or the branch containing the feud-
ing officials or agencies is considered to be the client, then the 
attorney general may have only one client involved and no 
conflict of interest would exist. In that event a court could 
decide no case or controversy exists 154 and dismiss the case, or 
use its inherent powers to ensure the adversarial process and 
prohibit the attorney general from representing both sides of 
the controversy. 155 
The attorney general may also run afoul of the powers and 
duties imposed upon the office by the constitution and statutes 
of the state. The attorney general by law often has the exclu-
sive156 ability to represent the state in court or to hire private 
counsel for state entities or to provide legal counsel to a partic-
ular agency. 157 If the attorney general fails to do so because of 
alleged conflict questions, the attorney general may be violat-
ing the duty so imposed. 158 
1fi4. Cf State v. Thomas, 766 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1989) (Hecht, J., dissenting) 
(The court granted writ of mandamus, in an unprecedented case where in an ac-
tion by the State, represented by the Attorney General, against a stateagency was 
also represented by the Attorney General. The result was that state sued itself, 
the Attorney General argued against himself, and both the state and the Attorney 
General both won and lost.) 
1fifi. Public Uti!. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1988). Some courts 
have found that a public official possesses the implied authority to employ special 
counsel when the legal officer is disqualified as in the case where a dispute exists 
between two agencies of a government body. See, e.g., COMMCO v. Amelkin, 46fi 
N.E.2d 314 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984), Zablow v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, 246 
N.Y.S.2d 4~i4 (App. Div. 1964). 
156. State v. Mississippi Pub. Util. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779, 782 (Miss. 1982). 
1fi7. In Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd., fi68 S.W.2d ns (Tex. 1978), the court 
refused to allow the attorney general to sue the Water Quality Board because the 
attorney general had the exclusive right tu represent state agencies and it would 
be inappropriate for the attorney general to allow the Board to have special coun-
sel. 
1fi8. See, e.g., Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom 
of Info. Comm'n, :3H7 A.2d 533 (Conn. 1978). 
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b. Dual roles within an agency. The second type of con-
flict is that involving the representation of one agency with 
several functions. Representing one agency with conflicting 
functions is usually analyzed as involving a conflict of interest 
for the atton1ey general's office. How can it truly be a conflict 
of interest in the traditional sense under the ethical rules be-
cause only one client is involved? The conflict really occurs 
because of a conflict in roles of the agency, not because two 
clients of one law office have conflicting interests. Of course, 
this analysis only applies if one takes the view that the agency 
rather than certain individuals or departments within the 
agency is the client. A traditional conflict of interest would 
exist if the different individuals were viewed as the clients 
because attorneys from the same office would be representing 
parties with conflicting interests. The application of the ethical 
rules under that view would be the same as that used under 
the two agency analysis. 
If, however, the view is taken that the agency is the client 
and the client has two functions, one of which is investigative 
and one of which is adjudicative, the attomey general's office is 
only representing one client. Under that view the only ethical 
concem would be the prohibition against an attomey taking a 
position adverse to the client. Rule 1.13 would be useful in this 
context. Because the entity would be considered the client, the 
lawyer would not be taking positions adverse to the client if the 
highest authority within the client determined what position 
should be taken ultimately. The use by the courts of due pro-
cess analysis rather than conflict of interest analysis is appro-
priate if the agency is viewed as the client. 
c. Investigation of or prosecution of public officials. The 
attorney general's prosecution of a public official brings into 
play both the general conflict of interest rule and the former 
client conflict of interest rule. The general conflict of interest 
rule159 prohibits an attorney from representing a client if the 
representation will be directly adverse to another client'60 or if 
the representation of that client may be materially limited by 
159. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (West 1992). 
160. An exception exists when the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client and each client con· 
sent~. after consultation. !d. at 1. 7(a). 
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the lawyer's responsibilities to another. 161 The rule addressing 
the conflict of interest in regard to a former client prohibits a 
lawyer from representing a person in the same or a substan-
tially related matter when that person's interests are mate-
rially adverse to the interests of a former client. 162 The rule al-
so prohibits a lawyer from using information related to the 
representation of a former client to the disadvantage of a for-
mer client. 163 
These two rules of professional responsibility are implicat-
ed when a state attorney general criminally prosecutes a state 
official who has been or is represented in his official capacity 
by the attorney general's office. An argument could be made 
that the prosecutor in a criminal case is representing a client 
(the state) in a matter where the representation will be directly 
adverse to another client (the public official). Furthermore, in 
certain instances, the public official being prosecuted could 
claim that the prosecutor is representing the state in a matter 
substantially related to a matter in which the prosecutor repre-
sented the public official or is using information related to the 
previous representation of the public official to the disadvan-
tage of the public official. 
The argument for prohibiting the attorney general from 
prosecuting public officials has appeal at first blush but suffers 
from a lack of reality. Accepting the argument as valid would 
preclude attorneys general from the prosecution of any case of 
malfeasance of a state official who happened to be represented 
in his official capacity by the attorney general's office. Many 
attorneys general have a specific statutory duty to prosecute 
crimes involving public officials. To adopt a per se conflict rule 
prohibiting all prosecutions of individuals the attorney 
general's office represents in an official capacity would unneces-
sarily tie the hands of the attorney general. The approach tak-
en by the courts in Troutman 164 and Mecham 165 makes sense. 
161. An exception is made if the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not be adversely affected and the client consents after consultation. ld. at 
1.7(b). 
162. An exception exists if the former client consents after consultation. ld. at 
1.9(b). 
163. An exception exists if the information can be used pursuant to Rule 1.6 or 
if the information has become generally known. ld. at 1.9(c)(1). 
164. United States v. Troutman 814 F.2d 1428 (lOth Cir. 1987). 
165. Mecham v. Superior Court ex rel. Corbin, Sup. Ct. of Az. No. CV-87-0410-
SA, State Grand Jury Inquiry No. 235, G.J. n, Nov. 18, 1987. 
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Those courts detennined that no actual conflict existed when 
the attorney general prosecuted a government official previous-
ly represented in his official capacity by the attorney general's 
office if no confidential communications related to the criminal 
prosection had occurred. 
If the identity of the attorney general's client is other than 
the public official, then no conflict of interest concern should be 
raised. For purposes of Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 the public official 
never was a client of the attorney general, so the attorney 
general would not be taking a position adverse to a client or a 
former client by criminally prosecuting the public official. Addi-
tionally, Rule 1.13 would allow the attorney general to take 
steps, including disclosure within the entity client in some 
instances, when a person involved with the entity violates the 
law in a way which may be imputed to the entity. 166 If the 
client is the state or the people or the public interest, the pros-
ecution may well fall within the bounds authorized in Rule 
1.13. 
d. Disagreements as to what the public interest is. The 
conflicts of interest raised by the attorney general's representa-
tion of the public interest are as problematic when analysis is 
attempted using the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility 
as is in the two agency conflicts. In fact they are very similar. 
On one side of the dispute the attorney general represents the 
public interest as the attorney general perceives it to be. On 
the other side of the dispute is a public official or agency with 
views differing from those of the attorney general. Thus, two 
clients, or a client and a former client, are in dispute. The at-
torneys general and the courts must engage in the same bal-
ancing of the constitutional, statutory and ethical mandates as 
discussed above regarding two agency conflicts. 
One important distinction can be made, however. Often in 
situations where the attorney general is litigating in the public 
interest, the attorney general is an actual party to the litiga-
tion and is not viewed as representing a client. Most of the 
ethical conflict rules don't really address that issue because 
they focus on representing a client with adverse interests. Rule 
1.8(b) does prohibit a lawyer from using "infonnation relating 
to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client 
166. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.18 (West 1992). 
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unless the client consents after consultation."167 Rule 1.9(b) 
prohibits a lawyer from using "information relating to the rep-
resentation to the disadvantage of the former client except as 
Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the 
information has become generally known."168 If the agency or 
public official who is now in a dispute with the attorney gener-
al is viewed as a client or a former client of the attorney gener-
al, then the attorney general could not generally use the infor-
mation related to the representation of that client to the disad-
vantage of the client. 
An attorney general may, however, be able to rely on Rule 
1.6(b)(2) as justification for using the information to the disad-
vantage of the client. Rule 1.6(b)(2) allows a lawyer to divulge 
the information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the law-
yer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client."169 
While this rule is generally seen to apply to fee disputes and 
legal malpractice suits, its language does not preclude a broad-
er use. For example, suppose an attorney general of a state 
were obliged to enforce an open meetings law. Assume further 
that the attorney general's office discovered through the office's 
representation of an agency170 that the agency violated the open 
meetings law. That information would be information related to 
the representation of the agency and release of the information 
would be disadvantageous to the agency. Under Rule 1.8(b) the 
attorney general would be unable to use the information with-
out client consent. However, if the attorney general were to sue 
the agency to enforce the open meetings law, then the attorney 
general could use the information pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(2) to 
establish a claim on behalf of the attorney general in the con-
troversy with the agency. 
The identity of the client question poses the same dilem-
mas to the government lawyer in the "public interest" conflict 
area as in the others. Analysis of each type of conflict exempli-
fies the unhelpful nature of the Rules regarding conflicts when 
they are applied to government attorneys in a wholesale fash-
167. ld. at lJ!(b). 
168. Id. at 1.9(b). 
169. ld. at 1.6(b)(2). 
170. For purposes of this example, the agency will be viewed as the client of the 
attorney general. 
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ion. Similar lack of guidelines await the government lawyer in 
the area of confidentiality requirements. 
C. Confidentiality Rules 
The duty of confidentiality is at the core of the concept of 
loyalty to the client. Rule 1.6 provides that information regard-
ing the representation of a client shall not be revealed unless 
the client consents. 171 However, the lawyer may reveal infor-
mation relating to the representation if disclosure is impliedly 
authorized to carry out the representation. 172 Additionally, the 
lawyer may reveal information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary 
( 1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act 
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death 
or substantial bodily harm; OR 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer 
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to estab-
lish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the 
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, 
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of the client .... 173 
The identity of the client dilemma impacts the confidential-
ity duties of govemment lawyers as well as the avoidance of 
conflicts of interests obligations. If the client is viewed as the 
people or the public interest, then presumably all citizens 
would have a right to all information in the hands of a govern-
ment attomey. In fact a govemment attorney may have are-
sponsibility to inform the "client" of all information relevant to 
a particular matter. If the state is viewed as the client, then all 
branches of govemment would be entitled to the information. If 
the agency or public official is viewed as the client, then the 
lawyer's duties of confidentiality are very restrictive. 
The real problem in the area of confidentiality and the 
goverrment lawyer is to what extent the govemment lawyer 
can be or should be a whistle-blower. 174 If the information 
known by a lawyer involves an intent to commit a future crime 
171. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (West 1992). 
172. ld. at 1.6(a). 
173. ld. at 1.6(b). 
174. See Roger C. Cranton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the 
Government Lawyer, fi GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (1991). 
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which will likely result in imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm, then under Rule 1.6(b)(2) the lawyer may reveal it. Most 
information held by a government lawyer does not fall into that 
category. Usually the information involves behavior that will 
cause harm to the public interest or the financial status of the 
state. Rule 1.6 does not seem to allow divulging of that infor-
mation. Rule 1.13 would only allow disclosure to higher author-
ities within the entity viewed as the client. These rules ignore 
federal and state statutes requiring government employees to 
disclose certain unlawful actions by public officials. 175 Even 
more importantly they impose an obligation of silence on the 
lawyer. Many believe, particularly in this post-Watergate soci-
ety, that wrongdoings by public officials ought not be covered 
up by attorneys. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct seem 
to prevent a government lawyer from responding to those con-
cerns. 
VI. PROPOSED RULES 
Rules other than those promulgated by the American Bar 
Association have been drafted by groups attempting to devise 
standards more appropriate for government attorneys. Unfor-
tunately they have never been seriously considered by the ABA 
in drafting its rules and have never been adopted by the state 
judiciary or legislatures. The ABA has had a "super-legislature" 
status where ethical rules are concerned. 176 In some instances 
that deference to the ABA may be appropriate, because it is the 
lawyer organization with the greatest membership and has 
employed a very involved process in developing its rules. The 
ABA has been traditionally lacking in government attorney 
membership, however. In the past it has refused to include 
within its rules amendments offered by various government 
attorneys. Its members have denounced attempts by govern-
ment attorneys to obtain exceptions for themselves under the 
Rules. 177 
17fi. ld. 
176. Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Makin!( of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (19R9). 
177. The ABA House of Delegates condemned the Department of Justice position 
that prosecutors can contact individuals represented by counsel without the permis-
sion of their attorney. While this author may disagree with the Department's posi-
tion, it ought not to be dismissed outright as a clear violation of the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct. The Rules fail to delineate appropriate bounds of activity 
when a prosecutor may be acting as an investigator. It certainly doesn't seem to 
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Recently the ABA has made efforts at incorporating gov-
ernment attorneys into its fold. Perhaps if its efforts are suc-
cessful, increased sensitivity to the realities daily encountered 
by government attorneys would result. Working through the 
ABA processes may be the only way government attorneys can 
obtain ethical guidelines relevant for their roles. It is with the 
hope of beginning the needed serious dialogue that the follow-
ing amendments to the existing Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct are made. 
A. Confidentiality of Information 
RULE 1.6 Confidentiality of Information 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
representation of a client unless the client consents after 
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly autho-
rized in order to carry out the representation, and except as 
stated in paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal 
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm; OR 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the 
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil 
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which 
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in 
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of 
the client; or 
(3) to prevent a public official or public agency 
from committing a criminal or illegal act that a govern-
ment lawyer believes is likely to result in harm to the 
public good; or 
( 4) to remedy substantial adverse effects on the 
public good which the government lawyer believes was 
caused by a criminal or illegal act of a public official or 
public agency; or 
(5) when otherwise required by law. 
The proposed changes to Rule 1.6 found in (b)(3) would 
allow a government lawyer to divulge information to prevent 
be an "act of sheer governmental arrogance" as indicated by one delegate. Jerry E. 
Norton, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74 JUDICATURE 203, 207 (Dec. 1991). 
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an illegal or criminal act in the future by a public official or 
agency. The government lawyer would have to believe that the 
act is likely to result in harm to the public good before divulg-
ing the information. 
The changes contained in (b)(4) would allow a government 
lawyer to reveal information of a past criminal or illegal act of 
a public official or agency in more limited circumstances. For 
past acts the information could only be divulged to remedy 
substantial adverse effects on the public good. 
Section (b)(5) is intended to release the government lawyer 
from confidentiality restraints when the lawyer has an obliga-
tion under state or federal statutes to disclose certain informa-
tion. A definition of government lawyer would need to be draft-
ed. It could include those employed on a full time basis as well 
as lawyers representing a government agency or official in an 
official capacity on a case by case basis. 
The proposed rule is not intended to include an attorney 
representing a public official who is a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding. The rule is intended to allow disclosures, not to 
mandate them. Thus, the government attorney can decide what 
is appropriate disclosure, if any, in a particular situation. 
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B. Conflict of Interest Rules 
1. The general rule 
RULE 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's re-
sponsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the 
lawyer's own interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When repre-
sentation of multiple clients in a single matter is under-
taken, the consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the ad-
vantages and risks involved. 
(c) A government attorney shall not be in violation of this 
Rule when a government attorney represents more than one 
client or interest in a particular matter if the government 
attorney believes in good faith that such dual representation is 
required or allowed by relevant constitutional or legislative 
provisions. 
75 
The proposed addition to Rule 1.7 is intended to provide a 
safe harbor to government attorneys acting in a manner consis-
tent with the applicable law regarding the attorney's powers 
and duties. The language suggested is a bit amorphous because 
of the variety of the sources and types of powers and duties of 
the government attorneys. If the proposed addition were made, 
a court faced with a claim of conflict of interest by a govern-
ment attorney would analyze the relevant substantive law to 
determine whether the dual representation is allowed without 
resorting to the ethical rules. If the court finds that the law 
allows dual representation, then the government attorney 
would have an easy time showing the required good faith belief 
in any disciplinary proceeding. If a court determined that the 
relevant law did not allow dual representation, the government 
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attorney could still carry the burden of showing the basis of a 
good faith belief that dual representation was allowed and 
avoid disciplinary sanctions. The use of the good faith belief 
standard allows the government attorney to be wrong but ethi-
cal. 
2. Prohibited transactions 
RULE 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions 
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representa-
tion of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the 
client consents after consultation. This subsection shall not 
apply to government lawyers engaging in dual representation 
in a particular matter pursuant to the conflict of interest ex-
ception in Rule I. 7(c). 
The additional language proposed for Rule 1.8(b) is intend-
ed to allow a government lawyer to use adverse information 
against a client when the government lawyer (or the office of 
the lawyer) is representing both parties in an adversarial situa-
tion. 
3. Former client 
RULE 1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a 
matter shall not thereafter: 
(a) represent another person in the same or a substan-
tially related matter in which that person's interests are ma-
terially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client consents after consultation except as allowed in 
Rule 1. 7(c); or 
(b) use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as rule 1.6 would 
permit with respect to a client or when the information has 
become generally known. 
The change to Rule 1.9(a) is necessary to bring forward the 
exception to the conflict of interest rule for government attor-
neys to those situations involving former clients. No change to 
Rule 1.9(b) would be necessary because the proposed changes to 
Rule 1.6 would also apply to information regarding former cli-
ents of the government attorney. 
39] GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS AND ETHICS 
C. The Government as a Client 
RULE 1.13 Organization as Client 
(f) If a government lawyer knows that an officer, em-
ployee or other person associated with the government is en-
gaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter 
related to the lawyer's representation that is a violation of a 
legal obligation to the government or the public, or a violation 
of law which reasonably might be imputed to the government, 
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best 
interest of the government or the public. In determining how to 
proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the serious-
ness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and na-
ture of the lawyer's representation, governmental policies con-
cerning such matters, governmental chain of command, and 
any other relevant consideration. Any measures taken shall be 
designed to minimize disruption of the governmental 
functions. Such measures may included among others: 
( 1) asking for reconsideration of the matter; 
(2) referring the matter to a higher authority in the 
government, including, if warranted by the seriousness of 
the matter, referral to the highest government official 
that can act in behalf of the government on the particular 
matter as determined by applicable law even if the high-
est authority is not within the agency or department the 
attorney generally represents; and 
(3) advising that a separate legal opinion on the 
matter be sought and considered; and 
( 4) divulging of information to persons outside the 
government pursuant to the limitations provided in Rule 
1.6. 
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The addition of subsection (f) to Rule 1.13 is necessary to 
give government attorneys guidelines similar to those providing 
representation to other organizations. It contemplates that the 
attorney will act in furtherance of the governmental and public 
interest. It makes it clear that the attorney can go outside the 
agency he or she generally represents if that is where the high-
est authority on the matter is. The amendment avoids the 
problem of having to identify which organization is the client 
because it does not unilaterally prohibit disclosure of the in-
tended act outside the agency which many previously viewed as 
the client organization. The amendment also incorporates the 
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confidentiality standards for government attorneys found in the 
proposed amendments to Rule 1.6. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It has been said of an organizational structure that if it 
handles most of the data better than any other theory, it will 
do. 178 The same can be said of ethical rules: if they handle most 
of the circumstances lawyers encounter, they will do. The cur-
rent rules do not provide guidelines for the many circumstances 
government lawyers encounter. The proposed rules would hold 
government attorneys to high ethical standards and at the 
same time give them an opportunity to give due consideration 
to the responsibilities imposed upon their offices by the con-
stitutions and statutes. 
178. Speech of Sam Deloria, Director, American Indian Law Center, on file in 
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S T A T E city/county Advice to municipal- lature re: const'l prosecution Advice to 
officials DA's ities invalid laws validity or appeals State 0 officials 0 
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